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1 Overview
The concept of good governance came to the fore
in the 1990s1 against the backdrop of the failure
of adjustment policies and with a view of
developing a new recipe for enhancing the
efficiency and capacity of governments to deliver.
The World Bank, UNDP, as well as many other
key international players, promoted the good
governance paradigm as another side of the
economic liberalisation coin. While some
considered it a recycled version of politics
(UNESCAP 2011), others argued that it
presented a new perspective on development
(OHCHR 2007), since it brought to the fore
principles such as accountability in societies
suffering from the pathologies of authoritarian
corruption (UNDP 1997). While some definitions
tended to limit the concept to the principles that
make democracy function, for example creating
representative and accountable government,
building a strong and pluralistic civil society and
supporting the rule of law and access to justice
institutions (AUSAID 2000); others, that
highlighted responsive public administration and
wider participation, were seen as real indicators
of good governance (Graham et al. 2003).
Larry Diamond noted that most of good
governance elements require a political will
rather than material:
Every government can create an independent
counter corruption commission and electoral
administration, and every parliament can pass
laws giving citizens freedom of information
and requiring that officials declare their
assets. Every government can decide to
tolerate an independent and critical press and
a vigorous civil society. These require political
will, not economic development or high state
capacity. (Diamond 2008)
When the concept of good governance entered
the realm of public debate in Egypt in the late
1990s, it did so as a result of donors’
prioritisation of its integration into public policy.
Theoretically, the good governance agenda was
underpinned on the one hand by the
strengthening of the capabilities of Government
to perform assigned duties, while on the other
hand, creating the enabling environment for
people to hold the government accountable for
its policies and actions on the other. As such,
good governance signified not only the right of
citizens to have transparent and accountable
government, but also the necessity to capacitate
public administration to implement public
policies effectively (Diamond and Morlino 2004).
In practice, what was lacking in the good
governance lens was the ability to capture the
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elements of the state–society spilled over, and
new cultures of engagement emerged, which
were at once both inclusionary and exclusionary.
This article examines how accumulative bad
governance in Egypt contributed to the fall of the
Mubarak regime in relation to questions of
accountability, responsiveness in citizen
engagements and rule of law.
2 Insidious corruption
Some of the most forceful slogans that catalysed
people to join the protests in Tahrir Square were
associated with ending corruption. In Mubarak’s
last years, corruption had become one of the
most talked about issues in daily Cairene
conversations; in particular since a series of
catastrophes had struck the country, leading to
the loss of lives and which were all believed to be
a consequence of the absence of accountability.
The pervasiveness of corruption catalysed the
revolution in several ways: first, the absence of
accountability mechanisms, second, the alliance
between business and the ruling powers was
predatory and hence became a source of deep
resentment within the public and third,
corruption had a spillover effect into wider
society and became part of the social fabric. Each
of these dimensions of corruption in relation to
the uprisings will be dealt with briefly below.
2.1 Corruption and absence of accountability
In theory, accountability is a cornerstone of
democratic governance and it simply means that
those who hold public office must give account for
their actions. There are two types of public
accountability in a democratic state; vertical and
horizontal. Vertical accountability refers to the
power of citizens to hold those in power
accountable through, for example setting up anti-
corruption and human rights non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), publishing corruption
stories in the media and voting in public
elections. Horizontal accountability embodies a
wide range of institutions that oblige the
accountability of officeholders to one another;
‘this constraints executive power and so helps
protect constitutionalism’ (Diamond 1999). Some
examples of horizontally accountable institutions
are watchdog financial bodies, the judiciary and
parliament. In a democratic society, both types of
accountability complement each other. In
authoritarian regimes vertical accountability is
undermined by rigging elections, repressing civil
society organisations and cracking down on free
media. Also, the authoritarian regimes always
outwardly maintain the structures of horizontal
accountability but without any substance or
effect. For example, a crippled parliament not
only prevents genuine accountability, but also
legitimises apathetic, irresponsive and corrupt
government.
In Egypt, both vertical and horizontal
accountability have been most inept. Vertically,
the depoliticisation of civil society crippled civic
associations’ ability to act as a watchdog and
demand government accountability (see Abd el
Wahab, El Naggar, Tadros, this IDS Bulletin),
while the co-option of the media also obstructed
its ability to hold the government accountable.
Horizontally, one of the most important forums of
holding the government accountable, the
parliament, had been dominated by ruling party
members and government sympathisers. This in
itself led to the nomination of MPs and was duly
criticised as lacking in any accountability. The
parliamentary elections in 2005 witnessed wide-
scale vote purchase, as voters sold their votes in
poor areas in return for 30 Egyptian pounds (the
price of half a kilo of beef). This amount soared
in wealthy areas, such as Nasr city constituency in
Cairo, to hit 1,000 Egyptian pounds. Viagra pills,
cigarettes stuffed with cannabis, mobile phones,
clothes and food varieties were used to gain
constituency in the elections.2 The parliamentary
elections in 2010 were the worst in terms of vote
purchase, violence and exclusion of all
opponents.3
2.2 Predatory coalition between the ruling party and
business
The convergence of financial interests of actors
who were simultaneously in government/ruling
party and the business sector opened the door for
the emergence and consolidation of highly
predatory coalitions. In 2002 alone, as many as
48 high-ranking officials including former cabinet
ministers, provincial governors and members of
parliament were convicted of influence peddling,
favouritism, profiteering and embezzlement
(Al Ahram Weekly (2004).4 These included a former
minister of finance, a former head of the
Customs Authority, a former governor of Giza
governorate, as well as some prominent bankers
for corruption related to unpaid loans;
newspapers and lay people spoke about other
cases where no official action was taken.
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The Ministry of Administrative Development’s
role in fighting corruption was only cosmetic,
since the relationship between politics and
business remained beyond scrutiny. New laws to
curb corruption (i.e. the customs and taxes laws
and by-laws) existed only on paper and when, in
2007, the Minister of Administrative Reform
established the Committee of Transparency and
Integrity, its role was strictly consultative:
proposing a national strategy and appropriate
legal and administrative frameworks to combat
corruption and help people to get their
complaints heard and properly addressed.5
Four major governmental activities were the
most associated with corruption: government
purchases, customs and taxes, job recruitment
and local administration. The latter particularly
was described by Dr Zakareya Azmy, the chief of
the Mubarak’s staff and a parliamentarian, as
‘sinking up to its ears in corruption’. Yet Dr
Azmy, who was publicly perceived as an
outspoken parliamentarian against corruption
and maladministration, often voicing critical
views more vigorously than opponents
themselves, was arrested on charges of
corruption after Mubarak stepped down in
February 2011.
One case which personified the predatory nature
of the business-ruling party coalition was that of
the al-Salam Boccaccio 98 ferry disaster. Mamdouh
Ismail, an MP, was the owner of the al-Salam
Boccaccio 98 ferry which sank on 3 February 2006,
shortly after leaving Saudi Arabia on its way to
the Egyptian port of Safaga. Only 338 passengers
survived out of the 1,414 who were on board.
Following the incident, Mamdouh Ismail fled the
country, and now lives in the UK. The
parliamentary committee that investigated the
catastrophe found that the ferry’s owner had
failed to meet a series of basic safety standards.
The committee condemned ‘wicked
collaboration’ between the shipping company
and some top government officials. The
investigation indicated that the circumstances of
the accident ‘point to a hideous image of
corruption in a utility related to people’s lives’.
On 27 July 2008, Mamdouh Ismail was acquitted
after a two-year trial. Four hours after the
verdict came out, the general prosecutor
contested the court ruling because of mounting
civil discontent and the anguish among families
of the victims (Al Masry Al Youm 2008).6 It is
highly significant that 11 days following the
collapse of the Mubarak regime, the general
prosecutor ordered a new investigation of the
whole case.
2.3 The spillover effect
Bribery became systematically entwined in
Egypt’s daily life. People bribe public employees
to get both legal and illegal services (Fawzy
Henien 2007a). Although the circles of
corruption had expanded, spilt over from state to
society to represent almost a normative
framework, by default, counter-coalitions
emerged against corruption. There was a great
uprising against regime policies across all the
institutions that comprised the professional
middle-class. In universities, the March 9th
movement called not only for the independence
of universities but also to remove violations of
human rights. Not surprisingly, a large segment
of participants in the January 25th revolution
emerged from the middle-class, and sometimes
upper middle-class. They found that corruption
was a real impediment to improving and
prospering in a safe environment. This may
suggest a rethinking of certain ideas that linked
revolution and deprivation. Revolution, as the
Egyptian case suggests, may occur as a
consequence of rampant corruption.
Indeed, the relationship between financial
corruption and human rights violations was one
of the main catalysts that inspired the January
25th revolution. It was not only the poor who
suffered from corruption but the ‘upwardly
mobile professional classes’ (Fadel 2011). Since
2003, all effort, exerted by Mubarak’s son Gamal
to widen his constituency through the inclusion
of the professional middle-classes and business
people in the ‘High Policy Committee’ within the
ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), proved
inadequate because the main goal was to co-opt
professionals through corruption rather than
providing them with authentic opportunities for
social mobility.
3 Apathetic bureaucracy
If there was one apparatus that Mubarak should
have been able to rely on to represent a counter
movement to the protests calling for his demise
it would have been the bureaucracy. Mubarak’s
regime had sought for many years to use the
bureaucracy to consolidate its supporters. Yet
significant sections of the bureaucracy had
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turned against the regime in its latter years.
Moreover, the bureaucracy became a symbol of
the disconnection between the government and
the public. In the January 25th uprisings, the
buildings that angry mobs demolished or burned
down were government buildings: police stations,
local premises of the government, and the main
building of the NDP, which also included the
National Council for Women and the National
Council for Human Rights.
Egypt has one of the oldest bureaucracies in the
world. The country’s dependence on the Nile for
its agriculture has made it a typical example of a
‘hydraulic managerial state which prevents the
nongovernmental forces of society from
crystallizing into independent bodies strong
enough to counterbalance and control the
political machine’ (Wittfogel 1957). Bureaucracy
has a unique position in Egyptian society.
Despite the mushrooming of private businesses,
many Egyptians still like to have a job in
government bureaucracy, even with the poor
salary and miserable working conditions, because
of the security it offers. The role of public
bureaucracy markedly changed after the
Revolution of 1952, when it began to assume new
responsibilities in the agricultural, commercial
and industrial sectors. ‘The number of civil
servants in the government and the public sector
has today reached an astounding 6.8 million,
with their total income reaching 86.1 billion
pounds (from the budget of 2009), an increase of
12% from the previous year. This is the largest
percentage of civil servants for any government
institution worldwide’ (CIPE 2009).
The expansion of public bureaucracy was seen by
successive regimes since the Revolution of 1952
as a real asset for domination. This explains why
the size of public bureaucracy increased by
25 per cent in the mid-1980s, even though there
was an economic recession during this period
(Zaki 1994). Dr Mustafa Kamel El Sayed, a
political science professor, noted that Mubarak
preferred to increase the role of public
bureaucracy and to be close to the bureaucratic
elite during his reign (El Sayed 1990).
The expansion of public bureaucracy caused
what Nazih Ayoubi called ‘Bureaucratic
Inflation’; bureaucrats increased in number,
while their capacity to perform duties decreased
(Ayoubi 1982). The Egyptian government
expressed its discontent at the performance of
public bureaucracy on many occasions. But there
was no decision taken to address the problem.
For example, the Minister of Administrative
Development indicated in an interview, that ‘the
administrative corruption in Egypt is
incomparable with any country in the world’.
Despite this recognition, the government did not
take any serious step to curb widespread
corruption (October Magazine 1997).
The advantaged position the public bureaucracy
enjoyed transformed it into a unique professional
class that defended its privileges and hindered
policies that undermined its dominance. Egyptian
bureaucracy was a model of ‘old bureaucracy’ in a
‘modern state’, different from what Peter Evans
called ‘Embedded Bureaucracy’, when people
actively collaborate with bureaucracy in using
resources, implementing projects, and evaluating
policies (Evans 1995).
Historically, the bureaucracy served as an
indispensible arm of the Egyptian regime. It
ensured stability and order, produced and
distributed public goods, punished the enemies of
the regime and maintained its grip on power
through rigging elections. Mubarak, like his
predecessors, expanded bureaucracy, consolidated
its power, covered up its human rights violations
and distributed benefits to those who occupied key
positions in the state apparatus. The
amalgamation of the NDP and public bureaucracy
resulted in not only a ‘partial public service’ but
was also deployed to prop up the regime.
However, during the last few years, the
relationship between Mubarak and its
bureaucracy declined; precipitated by their
inability to survive on the falling value of their
income. The formation of social and political
protest movements (see Ali, this IDS Bulletin)
emboldened the civil servants within the
bureaucracy to rise against the regime, using
similar tactics: demonstrations, stand-offs, and sit-
ins. In 2007, for example, around 20,000
employees at the Real Estate Tax Authority went
on strike, asking for salary increases and bonuses
(Daily News Egypt 2007) (see Ali, this IDS Bulletin).
In effect what was being eroded was the coalition
between the Mubarak regime and its bureaucracy
and this led to disintegration within the state
apparatus. This can be easily noticed following the
first days of the January 25th revolution. The NDP
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leaders, which used to orchestrate pro-regime
demonstrations based on the surplus of the public
bureaucracy, failed to find support from state
bureaucrats during and after the January 25th
nationwide demonstrations.
In addition to the collapse of the coalition
between Mubarak and public bureaucracy, the
corruption that permeated the bureaucracy had
a spillover effect on wider society. The inability of
public bureaucracy to perform its duties
coincided with a noticeable deterioration in the
performance of non-state actors and the private
sector. This supports Fukuyama’s argument that
there is a direct relationship between governance
and public culture, in that the accountable and
transparent government helps disseminate
positive public values in other society
organisations (Fukuyama 2004).
The bureaucracy maintained its supremacy in
licensing, establishing and monitoring private
enterprises, and NGOs. In such a context, it was
not possible to establish partnerships between
government, private sector and civil society that
could create developmental coalitions (Hyden
1997). A government report revealed that
consumer trust in economic performance fell
under the equilibrium index during the last few
months before the January 25th revolution:
reaching its lowest point, 72.6, 72.3 and 72.9 in
August, September and October 2010,
consecutively. Indexes over 100 correspond to
countries where a majority of people trust
economic performance, while an index under
100 corresponds to countries where a majority of
people have less trust in economic performance
(Egyptian Cabinet IDSC 2011).
In light of the above, one can say that Egypt
introduced a good example of ‘apathetic
bureaucracy’. In a survey about bureaucracy, the
results showed that decentralisation and delegation
of authority are absent. The authoritarian
political regime had deliberately created a highly
centralised public bureaucracy (Yassin 1994)
where citizens faced time-consuming processes
in public organisations due to the top-down
bureaucratic system (Al Masry 1997). In the end,
the bureaucracy came to symbolise the decay of
the regime and its disconnect with the people,
and was targeted as such in the torching of
buildings by the public, along with the State
Security Investigations apparatus (SSI) premises.
4 Rule of law and administration of justice
The rule of law is a fundamental pillar of
democratic governance. The absence of the rule
of law was one of the main grievances around
which people catalysed and mobilised prior to and
at the outset of the revolution. Furthermore, a
movement within the judges, who were supposed
to represent one of the cornerstones of regime
stability had turned against it and joined the
ranks of the opposition. Hence, the conditions of
injustice created a fertile ground for mobilisation,
while the resistance of the judges to cooption and
their radicalisation strengthened the growing
opposition’s contestation of regime legitimacy.
The January 25th revolution was a direct
reaction towards the lack of justice and human
rights violations. The widespread abuse of
ordinary citizens’ rights provided an
environment conducive to wider public
participation in anti-regime demonstrations. Not
surprisingly, the police stations and security
facilities were the first to be attacked by
demonstrators on 28 January; for decades the
public had perceived them as places for terror,
human dignity abuse and indecent treatment.
In principle, the rule of law ensures equity
between citizens and allows them to organise
their lives, protect the security of persons and
property, plan their futures and resolve disputes
in a rational and predictable way. In Egypt, there
were many obstacles facing the concept and
practice of the rule of law, which became acute in
the regime’s latter years.
A review of the laws passed during Mubarak’s
regime evidenced its prejudice towards the
predatory capitalist class. Evidence of the
protection of the monopoly of policies in the
economy is one real example (Fawzy Henien
2007a).
The law did not protect people’s lives and
properties while the law enforcement agencies
were accused of human rights violation, in
particular because of the interference of the
security apparatus in the public prosecution (Al
Masry Al Youm 2011) (see Tadros, this IDS Bulletin).
Moreover, the government selectively applied the
law – especially in the case of religious freedoms.
In Egypt, since sectarian attacks on non-Muslims
were heightened in the early 1970s, neither
Fawzy Accumulative Bad Governance58
violence brokers nor perpetrators have ever been
put on trial (Daily News Egypt 2008).
Discrimination faced Christians in many walks of
life; restrictions on building and repairing
churches, under-representation in elected
political bodies, lack of access to key government
positions, all of which violated the principle of
rule of law (Fawzy Henien 1998).
One of the bloodiest sectarian incidents occurred
almost a month before the fall of the Mubarak
regime. Some 23 people were killed and almost
70 hurt in the suspected suicide attack, which
happened during a New Year’s Eve service at the
al-Qiddissin (Saints) church in Alexandria.
There are unconfirmed reports referring to the
involvement of the regime in the attack. The
brutal incident was among the reasons that led
to widespread angry demonstrations among
Egyptians, particularly Christians who noticeably
participated in the January 25th revolution,
refusing the unceasing calls made by official
religious establishments to step back from
participation. This was a unique moment when
Christians decided to participate in anti-regime
demonstrations, and not to listen to the church
voice. This can be attributed to the strong sense
of prejudice they felt after the sectarian incident
in Alexandria. Not surprisingly, Christian-led
movements that participated in the
demonstrations of January 25th started their
organisation following the al-Qiddissin incident.
The Judiciary was supposed to be another
important cornerstone for the regime’s survival.
The disintegration of the implicit pact between
the government and the judges represented
another major weakening of the foundations of
Mubarak’s regime, which contributed to the
unification of counter coalitions in the wake of
the January 25th uprisings.
A number of strategies had been deployed to
co-opt judges, such as their appointment as legal
consultants in ministries in return for good
financial compensation, providing judges with
opportunities to travel to Gulf countries, with vast
salaries, etc. The rules governing these decisions
were not transparent. In addition, the budget of
Judiciary, and the monitoring and evaluating of
judges, were determined strictly by the minister of
Justice, who was part of the government.
Nevertheless there has been, during the last five
years, a strong movement among judges called the
‘Independence Trend’, resisting interference in
the Judiciary, which was increasingly radicalised in
Mubarak’s later years as a consequence of the
ruling party’s mobilisation to subjugate the
judiciary to the authority of the executive through
a proposed new judicial law.
5 Conclusion
The Mubarak regime carried all the symptoms of
bad governance: a crippled accountability
system; a captive civil society; absence of rule of
law and an irresponsive bureaucracy. Corruption,
bureaucratic pathologies and lack of justice
vividly contributed to the collapse of the regime.
Corruption obstructed development and became
a norm in life. The coalition between the regime
and its bureaucracy broke down, and unchecked
human rights abuses radicalised Egyptians, who
are not normally politicised, to take part in the
January 25th revolution.
Yet, the case of Egypt does not only expose its
poor governance credentials, but it also points to
the very limitations of the good governance
paradigm as it was externally advocated. The
good governance paradigm introduced by foreign
agencies focused on promoting accountability,
transparency, efficiency, rule of law,
decentralisation and participation, by enhancing
the institutional capacities of the government.
A relational understanding of governance would
have proven to be more analytically useful to
understanding the spillover effect from state to
society, as well as the convergence between them:
many actors served on both sides of the equation
simultaneously.
As shown above, corruption had a spillover effect
into the very fabric of society, and hence the
focus on its prevalence within government failed
to capture the normative dimensions of its
pervasiveness more widely. Furthermore, civil
organisations carry, to some extent, the same
pathologies of corruption, inefficiency and
ineptness. Not only are they unable to exercise
pressures on government to fulfil reform policies,
but they are also incapable of stimulating
grassroots participation in development projects.
Cosmetic governance may have given the
outward impression of sound progress yet, in
reality, they were often motivated by other
political agendas. For example, raising the
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capacity of the security apparatus to use
computer systems; modernising public petroleum
and gas companies and promoting investment in
the area of tourism, were all to serve the direct
needs of the regime to maintain its grip on power,
raise revenue and distribute patronage to its
loyalists in the form of licences, land, etc. What is
suggested here is that ‘Relational Governance’
manifests itself in political, cultural and
socioeconomic interactions, which cannot be
captured by a governance approach that focuses
heavily on government institutions.
Fawzy Accumulative Bad Governance60
Notes
1 There is a debate in Egyptian society over the
Arabic translation of the concept of good
governance. All the translations introduced
have been criticised. This can be partially
interpreted as a lack of apprehension of the
magnitude of the concept itself.
2 This was documented in the first report in
Arabic on the Parliamentary Election in 2005,
entitled Too Much Money… Too Little Politics,
conducted by the Egyptian Association for
Democratic Transition. It is accessible at
www.hrinfo.net/egypt/easd/2005/pr1100.shtml
3 The Cairo Institute for Human Rights
Studies, an active human rights centre,
summarised the whole elections in a few
words in a press release: ‘The unprecedented
climate of intimidation created by the
authorities within printed and visual media,
especially in independent media; the
escalating violent crackdown on the right to
peaceful assembly and political participation;
and the effective limitation of the
campaigning period to only one week are
indeed signs that the coming elections will not
meet the international standards for free and
fair elections. Rather, they offer implications
that the elections will be based on legislative
and constitutional corruption, with the
existence of tight administrative and
executive control. This confirms that the
forging of the will of the voters has started
early for this election’ (CIHRS 2010).
4 The report introduced one of the
unprecedented parliamentary debates around
the legal accountability of ministers in Egypt.
5 The Government considered the establishment
of the Committee of Transparency and
Integrity as one of the important achievements
it attained in 60 months, as seen in The Most
Important 60 Achievements in 60 Months, a booklet
prepared by the Egyptian Cabinet and
introduced by the Prime Minister in July 2009.
6 Egypt: Report on Ferry Disaster Condemns Official
Corruption, 26-4-2006, World Socialist website,
www.wsws.org/articles/2006/apr2006/ ferr-
a26_prn.shtml. For more details about the
relationship between the disaster and
corruption, see: The Report of the Fact-finding
Mission of the Egyptian Organization for Human
Rights. The report in Arabic is accessible at
www.eohr.org/ar/report/2006/re0219.shtml
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